This study extends the vulnerability analysis of a RFID authentication protocol and offers solutions to security weaknesses through enhanced measures. Vajda and Buttyan (VB) proposed a set of five lightweight RFID authentication protocols. Defend, Fu, and Juels (DFJ) did cryptanalysis on two of them -XOR and SUBSET. DFJ proposed repeated keys and nibble attacks on the XOR protocol. In this paper, we identify the source of vulnerability within VB's original successive session key permutation algorithm. We propose three enhancements -removing bad shuffles, hopping the runs, and authenticating mutually -to prevent DFJ's attacks, thereby significantly strengthening the XOR protocol without introducing extra resource cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a consequence of the massive deployment of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems in a variety of applications, security and privacy issues are still paramount concerns. Some consumer rights protection organizations, like CASPIAN (Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering) [2] , are against the use of RFID.
In general, a RFID system consists of three kinds of components: RFID tags (or transponders), RFID readers (or interrogators), and backend computer servers. An RFID tag is a tiny microchip embedded with a radio frequency antenna. It is capable of emitting the identification and other related data for the tagged item. A reader is another electronic device located between tags and backend server. A reader receives information from or sends information to the tag, which in turn communicates with (updates) the backend server. A backend server runs application software, hosts databases, and processes tag information received from a reader. It communicates with readers through wireless or wired connection on one end and with the enterprise network infrastructure on the other end. The wireless communication links between tags and readers are considered the most vulnerable part to security and privacy threats. As documented in the literature [1] , [7] , [13] , RFID and security experts have devoted much effort to address these threats. Among them, new RFID authentication protocols and analysis are most active areas of research [3] , [5] , [6] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [12] .
Adding security features to low-cost RFID tags is a daunting and challenging task because these tags are extremely resource limited and cannot afford strong cryptographic algorithms. Practical RFID authentication protocols should have the following characteristics: lightweight, anonymity (un-traceability), and mutual authentication.
VB [14] proposed a set of five lightweight RFID authentication protocols and also gave a brief analysis. Each protocol is extremely lightweight in terms of resources required, and is considered suitable for resource limited devices, like RFID tags.
DFJ [4] performed cryptanalysis on two of the above lightweight RFID authentication protocols -XOR and SUB-SET. DFJ proposed repeated keys and nibbles attacks in an attempt to compromise the XOR protocol. In this paper, we identify the source of vulnerability that existed in VB's original successive session key permutation algorithm. We propose three enhancements, i.e. removing bad shuffles, hopping the runs, and authenticating mutually, to prevent DFJ's attacks, thereby significantly strengthening the XOR protocol without introducing extra resource cost.
II. ORIGINAL XOR PROTOCOL AND REPEATED KEYS ATTACK
The original XOR protocol by VB [14] is a challengeresponse protocol. We use the following assumptions: (1) the readers and tags initially share a piece of secret key k (0) , (2) both reader and tag are capable of calculating a permutation Π (given soon) and, (3) reader and tag maintain a synchronized counter i to indicate the current run of authentication. The challenge-response process at the ith run can be described as:
Reader → Tag: a (i) = x (i) ⊕ k (i) . I.e., Reader picks a random number x (i) , calculates k (i) , then sends a challenge
. I.e., Tag calculates k (i) , extracts the challenge x (i) by k (i) ⊕a (i) , then send a response b (i) = x (i) ⊕ k (0) to Reader. Then the Reader verifies the Tag, because only the Tag knows k (0) .
Here k (i) = Π(k (i−1) ), and Π : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n is a permutation starting from the initial secret key k (0) . That is k (1) 
is truly random, no information about the secret k (0) is revealed from the communication.
Suppose n = 128 bit as key length, the steps of the permutation Π is given as follows:
1) At the run (i − 1)th iteration, the session key k (i−1) is split into 16 bytes, then cut each byte into two nibbles of 4-bit each. Then concatenate all left nibbles k
2) At the run (i)th iteration, the right half key k 3) The left half key k
in the similar nibble swaps. 4) Finally the next run session key k (i) is obtained by interleaving the nibbles of k
15,R , here "|" represents concatenation.
Observation:
The culprit here is the step 4) of the permutation. This step adds a perfect shuffle to Π. Regardless whether we do out-shuffle k (i) = k
15,L , after some number of shuffles the sequence will return to the original order [11] . This is why this permutation suffers from short cycles, as DFJ [4] identified, and makes the protocol vulnerable to their repeated keys attack.
Based on experiments performed by DFJ [4] , given an initial key k (0) , the successive session keys k (1) , k (2) , . . . , k (i) , . . . , k (10000) , which are generated by the permutation Π, cycle after an average of 68 sessions. They also found that about 32 percent of session keys have cycle 1; all of tested session keys eventually repeat themselves; and only one thousandth of keys have the maximum cycle of 36. Let c represent a cycle, then
, under the adversary model for the repeated keys attack [4] , an eavesdropper is able to form a valid response without knowing k (0) or x (i) . She calculates
, therefore she can impersonate a valid tag.
III. ENHANCEMENTS TO XOR PROTOCOL
In this section we propose three enhancements to the original XOR protocol, namely removing bad shuffles, hopping the runs, and authenticating mutually.
A. Enhancement 1 -Removing Bad Shuffles
In the step 4) of the original VB's permutation algorithm, we don't interleave nibbles of k
In this way we remove the out-shuffles from the permutation, therefore, the short cycles disappear, and the DFJ's repeated key attack is prevented. And we argue that without the out-shuffle step, the permutation Π is a Knuth Shuffle 1 , i.e., an algorithm for generating a random permutation of a finite set. In the case of 128-bit key length, there are two finite sets with 16 nibbles (0 ∼ F in hexadecimal) each. The algorithm Π to the left and right nibble sets (k Here is an example to illustrate how the permutation Π without out-shuffles works. We use a pseudo-random key generation program to create a 128-bit in hexadecimal as: C3 47 3F BB 8D B4 C1 E0 5F 4C 2D 8B 2B A6 BD 98, then split it into left and right nibble sets as
Then under the control of k 
And so on so forth, we can obtain k (3) , k (4) , k (5) , . . . k (3) Observations: The permutation Π does not create the new nibbles (hexadecimal symbols); instead it just moves all existing nibbles around by each run. If an ideal pseudo-random key generator is used during the initial key generation, within k (0) nibbles (0 ∼ F) should be uniformly distributed and unbiased. Theoretically, the random permutation Π can guarantee 16! × 16! permutations for a 128-bit sequence. However, if the distribution of 16 nibbles is not uniform (as the above example shows) the frequencies of the 16 hex symbols are: 0(1), 1(1), 2(2), 3(2), 4(3), 5(1), 6(1), 7(1), 2) ). The total number of permutations is less than 16! × 16!, but still a huge number.
In practice, before installation of a k (0) 's to a tag, this k (0) should be tested to make sure it can be used to generate enough numbers (5 × 16! is already big enough) of session keys without repetition. This procedure is used to eliminate weak keys. If the key length is 128-bit, there are in total 2 128 k (0) 's. Even if there is only one good strong key among every one hundred keys, the total number of strong keys is about 2 121 , which is huge.
For curiosity, we carried out an experiment with a 128-bit key length, similarly as in [4] . We generated 1000 different k (0) 's, and from each k (0) we permutated 10000 times to generate session keys k (1) , k (2) , . . ., k (i−1) , k (i) , k (i+1) , . . ., k (10000) and put them into a file. We obtained 1000 such files with each containing 10000 session keys. Our experiment results show that there is no repeat session key within these 1000 files. So the repeated keys attack is prevented.
B. Enhancement 2 -Hopping the Runs
The purpose in making the session keys hop is so that the next session key does not have to be the immediate successor of the current session key. This makes the nibble attack [4] much harder, if not impossible.
Here is how the nibble attack [4] works. Starting from run i, the attacker Eve builds a table over the following number of runs. Two columns are the challenges and responses between Reader and Tag, i.e., a's and b's. The next column is the xor'ed result of the previous two columns, i.e., a (i) ⊕ b (i) = k (i) ⊕ k (0) . The last column is the xor'ed result of two of consecutive rows from the fourth column, which will give us the xor'ed result of two consecutive session keys. As observed, when a nibble of this last column becomes 0, the corresponding nibble of the session key k (i) becomes known. This is because in the original permutation case, the two continuous session keys are
If Eve detects that the second nibble of (k (i+1) ⊕ k (i) ) is "0000", then she has k In the permutation without out-shuffles situation (see Enhancement 1), two consecutive session keys are
Now the nibble attack only applies to gain two nibbles of k (0) : 17-th and 32-th nibbles. If the first nibble of (k (i+1) ⊕ k (i) ) is "0000", then she has k will not be easily recovered by observing "0000" nibbles seen in the last column of the Tab. I. For Tab. I, in the original XOR protocol, hopping offsets h 0 , h 1 , h 2 , . . . are all 0's, and i does not update. With hopping the runs, these offsets h 0 , h 1 , h 2 , . . . are functions of current session keys, e.g., h 0 = h(k (i) ).
The hopping function is simply defined as a resulting nibble by performing XOR on the first eight nibbles of the current session key. For instance, the hopping offset
m is the m-th nibble of the session key k (i) . Note that this hopping-offset formula could be changed to a simple hash.
With hopping the runs mechanism in the XOR protocol, even attacker Eve finds "0000" nibble seen in the last column of the Tab. I, she has no way of knowing hopping offsets except through guessing. Therefore the nibble attack is prevented.
This enhancement makes the nibble attack impossible. Meanwhile it may slow down the calculation speed somewhat, since the next session key is not just one iteration of the permutation -it is (hopping-offset + 1) iterations. Note, Table I  NIBBLE ATTACK.   run hop
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · Figure 1 . Hopped XOR mutual authentication protocol.
the "+1" is just to prevent repeat session keys in case of hopping-offset equal to 0.
C. Enhancement 3 -Authenticating Mutually
In general, a 3-pass mutual authentication protocol works as follows. Both parties Alice and Bob have a piece of shared secret k. Alice initiates the first pass by sending a challenge F k (R A ), in which F k is a kind of encryption (or cryptographic hash) function controlled by k, and R A is a random number chosen by Alice. Bob responds with F k (R B ) + R A in the second pass, where R B is random number chosen by Bob. In this second pass, Bob is authenticated by Alice, because only Bob is able to extract the random number R A . In the third pass, Alice acknowledges Bob by sending F k (R B + R A ) back. In this final pass, Alice is authenticated by Bob, since only Alice is able to restore R B with their shared secret k.
In the RFID system, mutual authentication is very important. Without mutual authentication, Reader and Tag could be out of synchronization for further communication. Due to these, challenges and responses between Reader and Tag have to keep changing to avoid traceability of the Tag. The XOR protocol is a 2-pass protocol. That is, only Tag is authenticated by Reader and Reader is not authenticated by Tag. We need to add a third pass to make it a mutual authentication protocol as in Fig. 1 .
We use the hopping the runs XOR protocol, where we change the next session key index as i + hopping-offset + 2 (instead of "+1" in Enhancement 2) in order to leave a middle permutation for the acknowledge message c (i) of the third pass. That is c (i) = x (i) ⊕ k (i+ (hi+2)/2 ) , where h i is the hopping-offset, and (h i + 2)/2 takes the greatest integer less than or equal to (h i + 2)/2.
In the first pass, Reader picks x (i) , calculates k (i) , and sends a challenge a (i) = x (i) ⊕ k (i) to Tag. Tag receives a (i) , calculates k (i) , and extracts x (i) by a (i) ⊕ k (i) , then responds by sending b (i) = x (i) ⊕ k (0) as the second pass. Only the legitimate tag is able to extract the challenge x (i) and create the response b (i) . By receiving b (i) , Reader authenticates the Tag. In the third pass, Reader sends c (i) = x (i) ⊕ k (i+ (hi+2)/2 ) back to Tag. Because only the legitimate Reader knows x (i) and is able to generate k (i+ (hi+2)/2 ) , and sending c (i) . After receiving c (i) , Tag knows it comes from the right Reader. So Tag authenticates Reader.
IV. CYCLE COMPARISON EXPERIMENT
Here we provide results that compare the cycles of session keys from VB's original XOR algorithm, and the XOR algorithm with the bad shuffle removed. For a 128-bit key, there are 16 symbols (0 ∼ F ). The total number of random permutations is 16! × 16!, which is a huge number. It is not practical to do an exhaustive test with our limited computing resources. Instead, we tested two shorter cases: 4-symbol (0 ∼ 3) and 8-symbol (0 ∼ 7). This experiment provided us with the opportunity to compare these two algorithms under the same conditions as a small permutation data set. It also provided empirical proof that our enhancement can significantly reduce the risk of DFJ's attack by increasing the difficulty or cost of carrying out DFJ's attack. We measure the difficulty of DFJ's attack by the number permutation cycles it takes for a successful attack.
For the 4-symbol situation, each symbol can be represented in two bits in binary. The key consists of two sets of those 4 symbols, and the key (and session key) length is 2 × 4 × 2 bits, i.e., 2 bytes. In an ideal case, the number of random permutations for concatenated two sets of 4-symbol is 4! × 4!, which is equal to 576.
For the 8-symbol situation, each symbol can be represented in 3 bits in binary. The key consists of two sets of those 8 symbols, and its length is 3 × 8 × 2 bits, i.e., 6 bytes. In an ideal case, the total number of random permutations for concatenated two sets of 8-symbol is: 8! × 8!, which is equal to 1,625,702,400. The testing results are given in Tab. II. Shorter cycles for the XOR without bad shuffle result from biased distribution of symbols in the initial keys (i.e. weak initial keys).
In the case of 48-bit keys, we generate 100 initial keys as shown in Tab. III. Cycle comparisons for the XOR without bad shuffle and the original XOR algorithm are shown in Tab. IV and Tab. V.
An unbiased initial key should contain all 8 symbols twice. In Tab. IV some initial keys yield shorter cycles, e.g., key 12, 19, 39, 46, 54, 66, 73, 76 . From the Tab. III the symbol distribution of the above initial keys are very biased; we can treat these initial keys as weakkeys. In extreme situation, like the key-66, the actual unique symbols are 2, 4, 1, 0, 5, it makes the cycle short.
We can have a filter to eliminate weakkeys. We did a simple experiment, changing one most frequent symbol to another symbol that was not originally in the initial key, and then all cycles will be maximal to 10000. The following bold italic symbols are the changed ones. From these experiments, we can see that if symbol distribution in an initial key is not too biased, then through the enhanced XOR algorithm we can generate enough number of session keys for the subsequent authentication uses.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we identified the source of weakness in the XOR authentication protocol proposed by Vajda and Buttyan. We made three enhancements to this protocol: removing bad shuffles, hopping the runs, and authenticating mutually. With these enhancements, the XOR protocol is greatly strengthened to resist the repeated keys and nibble attacks proposed by Defend, Fu, and Juels. Our enhancements to the XOR protocol do not introduce extra resource cost. The storage resource needed for the XOR protocol is only 128-bit plus some temporary storage for permutation use. The enhanced protocol is suitable for majority low-cost RFID system application scenarios. Table III  GENERATED 100 INITIAL KEYS.   key  key  key  key  00 42 42 43 01 71 62 62 37 25 54 47 00 24 36 53 53 63 50 51 44 53 65 31 50 57 10 75 66 45 16 43 74 53 42 43  01 46 40 22 37 10 25 33 57 26 13 47 15 34 04 37 10 61 51 06 44 21 14 22 14 54 76 76 25 45 51 32 54 33 53 cycle  cycle  cycle  cycle  cycle  cycle  cycle  cycle  cycle  cycle  0  36  10  55  20  4 
